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CASES  /  VONNISSE 
 
 
 
PAYING  THE  PIPER  (IN  PRAESENTIA) 
 
Xstrata  South  Africa  (Pty)  v  SFF  Association 
2012  (5)  SA  60  (SCA)∗ 
 
 
 
“… the long supple hand still holding the pan-pipes 
only just fallen away from the parted lips …” 
 
Kenneth Grahame Wind In The Willows 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This decision is an appeal from the decision of the South Gauteng High 
Court in SFF Association v Xstrata (2011 JDR 0407 (GSJ)). The court a quo 
decided incorrectly that the holder of an old-order mining right, which was 
converted into a (new) mining right in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (the “Act”), remains liable upon 
conversion for the payment of (contractual) royalties in terms of a mineral 
lease, which was concluded prior to enactment of the Act (see further 
Badenhorst “Paying the Piper (in Absentia) – SFF Association v Xstrata 
2011 JDR 0407 (GSJ)” 2012 Obiter 436). The appeal was upheld by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) (2012 (5) SA 60 (SCA) par 27). The 
decision was rendered by Wallis JA with the other judges concurring with his 
judgment. 
    Prior to the Act mineral-right holders could grant a mining right to a miner 
against payment of royalties or other forms of consideration (see further 
Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 2004 
(Revision Service 8) Ch 5). At issue on appeal was whether the obligation to 
pay royalties in terms of a mineral lease “survives the introduction of the new 
regime in respect of mining rights brought about by the Act” (par 7). As 
indicated by the SCA, the Act fundamentally changed the legal basis upon 
which rights to minerals are acquired and exercised (par 1). Previously 
mineral rights were vested in the owner of land or the holder of mineral 
rights, which rights could be exercised upon acquisition of a statutory 
authorization to exploit the minerals (see par 1). In terms of the new regime, 
common-law mineral rights were destroyed (par 8; and see also par 10) and 
“all mineral resources vested in the state as the custodian of such resources 
on behalf of all South Africans”, whereupon the state could confer the right to 
exploit such resources to applicants (s 2 and 3 of the Act; and par 1). Upon 
                                                          
∗
 I wish to acknowledge the comments and suggestions of one of the referees. 
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granting a mining right in terms of the Act (statutory) royalties have become 
payable to the state since 1 March 2010 (s 25(2)(g)) of the Act and the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act 28 of 2008). 
    In order to prevent disruption of the mining industry, provision was made 
in the Act for the continuation of old-order rights for different transitional 
periods ranging from one to five years and conversion of such rights during 
the periods of transition (par 3; and see also par 8). The transitional 
arrangements in Schedule II of the Act (“transitional arrangements”) inter alia 
ensured security of tenure of prospecting rights and mining rights and 
enabled holders thereof to comply with the Act (see par 8). (For a discussion 
of the transitional provisions of the Act, see Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral 
and Petroleum Law of South Africa 2004 Ch 25; Dale, Bekker, Bashall, 
Chaskalson, Dixon, Grobler and Loxton South African Mineral and 
Petroleum Law (2005) [SchII-1] et seq)). In particular, an old-order mining 
right remained valid for five years “subject to the terms and conditions under 
which it was granted” (item 7(1) of the transitional arrangements) and could 
be converted into a new mining right (item 7(2) of the transitional 
arrangements) if certain requirements were met. The applicant had to have: 
(a) met the requirements for lodgement of application for conversion; (b) 
conducted mining operations in respect of the mining right; (c) indicated that 
he would continue to conduct such mining operations upon conversion of the 
mining right; (d) had an approved environmental management programme; 
and (e) paid the prescribed conversion fee (item 7(3) of the transitional 
arrangements). 
    To recap, the Xstrata decision dealt with an old-order mining right that had 
been converted into a (new) mining right and the effect of these statutory 
changes on rights to royalties which accrued to a former holder of mineral 
rights by virtue of a mineral lease (par 1). 
 
2 Facts 
 
I have summarized the facts as set out in the decision of the court a quo with 
further references to the facts as stated in the SCA decision: During the era 
of possible international oil sanctions against the apartheid government, a 
wholly-owned company, Strategic Fuel Fund Association (“SFF”), was 
incorporated by the government to create storage depots for, procure and 
store crude oil. SFF constituted an organ of state and remains one in terms 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. SFF to this day 
continues to procure and store strategic oil on behalf of the state (endnote 
2). SFF held coal rights in the farm Klippoortjie which included disused coal 
mines in which crude oil was stored in underground containers. Tavistock 
Collieries (Pty) Ltd (“Tavistock”) held coal rights on Blesbokfontein, an 
adjacent farm, but could not mine for coal due to the serious risk of damage 
to the containers of SFF on Klippoortjie and the possibility of an 
environmental disaster happening. Tavistock is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Duiker Mining (Pty) Ltd, which is in turn a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Xstrata, a major international mining group (endnote 3). Tavistock claimed 
R300 million from SFF in compensation for the sterilization of its coal 
reserves. In terms of a settlement between the parties (exchange 
agreement) SFF had to grant Tavistock the right to mine for coal (by virtue of 
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a mineral lease) on a portion of Klippoortjie in exchange for a cession by 
Tavistock to SFF of coal rights to portions of Blesbokfontein, and an 
undertaking by Tavistock not to mine on certain portions of Blesbokfontein 
(see further par 2 and 4–5). During 2001 a mineral lease was notarially 
executed between the parties in terms of which mining rights to coal to 
Klippoortjie were granted to Tavistock against payment of royalties to SFF 
(see further par 3 and 6). After enactment of the Act, Tavistock converted its 
old-order mining right in terms of the transitional arrangements into a (new) 
mining right. 
    SFF contended that the obligation of Tavistock to pay royalties remained 
in force despite “the changes wrought by the Act to the system of mineral 
rights in South Africa” (par 3). Tavistock conceded that it remained obliged to 
pay royalties during the period of transition but denied that its obligation 
continued after conversion into a new mining right (see par 3). At issue was 
thus whether royalties were payable by Tavistock since enactment of the Act 
and especially upon conversion of the old-order mining right. 
 
3 Decision 
 
According to the court the terms “royalty” had a well understood and 
relatively universal meaning in this context (par 18). The court referred to the 
following definition of a “royalty” in the English Oxford Dictionary: 
 
“A payment made to the landowner by the lessee of a mine in return for the 
privilege of working it. Also, a payment made, or a portion of the production 
given, by a producer of minerals, oil or natural gas to the owner of the site or 
the mineral rights over it” (par 18). 
 
    An Australian and American definition of a “royalty” was also referred to 
(par 18). 
    In line with the arguments made on behalf of SFF, the court focused on 
the mineral lease, as well as the exchange agreement of which the mineral 
lease formed a component. 
 
3 1  In its focus on the impact of the Act on the old-order rights by virtue of 
the mineral lease as such, the court dealt with (a) the five-year period of 
transition (or the lesser period as might elapse until conversion), and (b) the 
period after conversion of the old-order right into a (new) mining right. 
(a) The court decided that during the period of transition the provisions of 
the Act created “a new right, statutory in origin, embodying the rights 
previously enjoyed under the relevant old-order right, together with an 
entitlement to convert that right into a mining right under the Act” (par 10; 
as to the features of old-order rights, see further Badenhorst “The Make-
up of Transitional Rights to Minerals: Something Old, Something New, 
Something Borrowed, Something Blue …?” 2011 4 SALJ 763). 
According to the court, an “old-order mining right” was acquired “on the 
same terms and conditions as it had hitherto enjoyed” (par 21). The court 
found that it was common cause between the parties that Tavistock as 
holder of an old-order mining right enjoyed the rights that it had under 
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the mineral lease and the old-order mining right was subject to the 
conditions contained in the mineral lease (par 10). These conditions 
included the conditions regarding the right to mine coal and the 
obligations to pay (contractual) royalties (see par 11). 
(b) Regarding the position upon conversion an of old-order mining right (by 
virtue of a prior mineral lease) into a (new) mining right, the court dealt 
with the arguments made on behalf of SFF. SFF contended that under 
item 7(4) of the transitional arrangements the conditions, attaching to 
Tavistock’s right to mine, as set out in the mineral lease, would remain in 
force after conversion unless these conditions were contrary to the 
provisions of the Constitution or the Act (see par 11). The court indicated 
some of the problems with the interpretation of item 7(4) (see par 13) 
and refrained from expressing a proper meaning of interpretation (par 
14). The court proceeded on the assumption in favour of SFF that its 
approach was correct (par 14). The court, however, subsequently 
rejected SFF’s further argument that continued payment of royalties was 
not expressly prohibited by the Act and would accordingly remain in 
force on conversion (par 11) and dealt with the qualification contained in 
item 7(4) of the transitional arrangements. According to Wallis JA, the 
qualification in item 7(4) required a different enquiry: 
 
“It requires each term or condition embodied in the old order mining right 
to be considered and assessed in the light of and against the provisions of 
the Constitution and the Act to determine whether it is contrary to either of 
them. Whether a term or condition is contrary to a provision or the 
provisions of the Act requires that the term or condition be considered, 
both as to its content and as to its effect, and weighed in the light of the 
entirely new system of mineral rights embodied in the Act. If it is 
inconsistent with that system then it is contrary to the provisions of the Act. 
The search is not for an express or implied prohibition of the provision in 
question. It is an assessment of its compatibility with the Act's provisions. 
If it is incompatible then it cannot form part of the terms and conditions 
attaching to a mining right obtained by way of conversion of an old order 
mining right” (par 16). 
 
   The court decided that: 
 
“after conversion of an old order mining right into a mining right, the 
preservation of a right to claim royalties under a contract, such as this mineral 
lease, concluded prior to the Act coming into force and maintained during the 
transitional period in the form of a condition attaching to an old order mining 
right, does not serve the purposes and would be contrary to the provisions of 
the Act” (par 26). 
 
    The court decided that upon such conversion the following happened: 
(a) Tavistock’s rights in terms of the mineral lease were terminated by the 
Act; 
(b) in particular, Tavistock’s right to mine the coal no longer had its origin in 
the mineral lease; 
(c) Tavistock’s right to mine the coal was derived solely from the (new) 
mining right; 
(d) this right to mine had its source in the custodianship of the state that was 
exercised over minerals; 
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(e) the right to mine stemed from the state and no longer from SFF; 
(f) continued payment of royalties to the SFF (the original mineral right 
holder) made little sense   (see par 21). 
    The court provided the following reasoning for its decision: 
(a) in exercising its custodianship of minerals the state secured an 
entitlement for itself to be paid (statutory) royalties upon the grant of 
mining rights (par 22); 
(b) it would be inconsistent to and unfair for the Act to permit and compel 
payment of (contractual) royalties under previous mineral leases and to 
extract payment of (statutory) royalties from holders of mining rights in 
terms of the Act (par 22); 
(c) double payment of royalties could imperil the financial viability of 
marginal mines and would be contrary to the obligation of the Minister of 
Mineral Resources in terms of section 3(3) of the Act to promote 
sustainable development of South Africa’s mineral resources (par 22); 
(d) Item 11 of the transitional arrangements of the Act expressly provided for 
the continued payment of royalties to certain bodies or persons, namely, 
indigenous communities or natural persons in very limited instances as 
an exception (see item 11(3))(see pars 23-24). In other words, non-
payment of (contractual) royalties to former mineral-rights holders was 
the rule rather than the exception; and 
(e) item 12 of the transitional arrangements of the MPRDA which provided 
that a person who could prove that his property had been expropriated in 
terms of the provisions of the Act could seek compensation from the 
state (par 25; see, however, the court’s subsequent rejection of item 12 
as a factor (par 25)). In other words, provision was made by the 
legislature to compensate former holders of mineral rights for the 
anticipated loss of royalties. 
3 2  The court also disposed of the broader argument which was advanced 
on behalf of SFF namely, that the exchange agreement constituted an 
indivisible whole of which the mineral lease and Tavistock’s obligation to pay 
royalties merely formed an integral part of the exchange agreement (see par 
11). It was argued that the royalty provisions were an erroneous 
categorization. The mineral lease was rather perceived as a quid pro quo for 
the performance of Tavistock’s obligations under the exchange agreement, 
and that the royalty component of the mineral lease was construed more 
akin to a purchase price for all the rights conferred upon Tavistock (par 19; it 
is preferable not to refer to payment of a purchase price in the case of an 
exchange agreement but, rather, payment of money because the first was 
an essential element of a contract of sale, whilst the second might be part of 
performance to be rendered in terms of an exchange agreement). The court 
decided that this amounted to a “strained and unnatural meaning to be given 
to the mineral lease” (par 19). The court found that the parties chose to 
embody the rights and duties in a notarial mineral lease in the conventional 
form and made use of conventional terminology (par 19).The court held that 
the parties should be taken at their word, namely, they “chose to say 
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royalties that would be payable and that was what the words they have used 
should be taken to mean” (par 20). 
 
4 Commentary 
 
One should be cautious of relying upon definitions from other mineral-law 
systems which differ in important and fundamental aspects from the South 
African system of the past and present. For instance, the royal prerogative to 
gold and silver and ownership of a mine is found in English law and vests 
the right to mine in the Crown (see Badenhorst “Ownership of Minerals in 
Situ in South Africa: Australian Darning to the Rescue” 2010 SALJ 646 662–
664) definition. The royal prerogative only featured in South Africa if it had 
been introduced by legislation. For instance, in the Cape Colony section 4 of 
Sir John Cradock’s Proclamation on Conversion of Loan Place to Quitrent 
Tenure, dated 6 August 1813, preserved the English law concept of the 
Crown prerogative by reserving “no other right but those on mines of 
Precious Stones, Gold or Silver” (Dale An Historical and Comparative Study 
of the Concept of Acquisition of Mineral Rights LLD thesis Pretoria University 
of South Africa (1979) 217; Benade v Mininster van Mineraal- en 
Energiesake 2002 JDR 0769 (NC) 8; and Sir John Cradock’s Proclamation 
was, however, repealed by Act 44 of 1968). The Act defines “contractual 
royalties” and “statutory royalties” in section 1 and such definitions could 
have been used by the court. 
    The decision brought an end to the uncertainty about whether the duty of 
a holder of an old-order mining right to pay (contractual) royalties continued 
(a) during the five-year (or shorter) transitional period; and (b) upon 
conversion of an old-order mining right into a (new) mining right. The 
decision was authority for the proposition that the duty to pay royalties 
continued during the period of transition. The fact that this principle was 
accepted as common cause by the parties was left intact by the court. This 
in line with the view that transitional arrangements had as its object a 
seamless continuation of existing mining operations (See Holcim SA (Pty) 
Ltd v Prudent Investors (Pty) Ltd [2011] 1 All SA 364 par 26). The court 
decided that the duty to pay such royalties was, however, terminated upon 
conversion of the old-order right into a (new) mining right. According to the 
court “preservation” of the right to claim royalties under a contract did not 
take place upon conversion of the old-order mining right into a (new) mining 
right. The word “extinguished” or “terminated’ was not used by the court and 
it is submitted that termination of rights rather than non-preservation took 
place. It is further submitted that the duty to pay royalties was terminated 
upon termination of the old-order mining right which was the source of the 
duty to pay royalties. Termination of the old-order mining right was not 
restricted to the successful conversion of the old-order mining right (and 
registration of the new mining right in the mineral and petroleum titles-
registration office (item 7(7) of the transitional arrangements; s 5(1)(d) of the 
Mining Titles Registration Act 16 of 1967), but also included failure to apply 
for such conversion (item 7(8)) or refusal of an application by the Minister. 
Mostert (Mineral Law Principles and Policies in Perspective (2012) 104) 
indicates that the last instance was not expressly provided for in the 
transitional arrangements and concludes that there is no statutory authority 
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for a conversion to be refused upon non-compliance with the requirements 
for conversion. However, in Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Mineral Resources (unreported decision) Case no 28980/10 (GNP) Zondo J 
recognized the last instance as a possible way of termination of an old-order 
mining right. The court first found that the Minister was bound to convert the 
old-order mining right into a (new) mining right if the holder thereof had met 
all the requirements for conversion that were prescribed by item 7(3) (see 1 
above) (par 89). The court found that if one of these requirements for 
conversion was not met, the Minister could refuse to convert an old-order 
mining right into a (new) mining right (par 89). In accordance with my original 
view (Badenhorst “Transitional Arrangements in terms of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002: Crossing a Narrow 
Bridge?” 2002 Obiter 250 275) it seems as if the third instance is possible 
despite not being expressly provided for in the transitional arrangements. In 
conclusion, conversion of an old-order mining right (and registration) is one 
of three possible ways of termination of an old-order mining right. 
    It is submitted that the court’s decision that payment of royalties after 
conversion of the old-order mining right would be contrary to the provisions 
of the Act is correct. The grant of the right to mine by someone other than 
the state, payment of royalties to someone other than the state (unless 
expressly provided for) and the continuance of the common-law position 
would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act (see further Badenhorst 
2012 Obiter 444–445). The exceptions of continued payment of royalties to a 
certain type of persons, namely communities, for which royalties accrued 
prior to the commencement of the Act and persons who might suffer undue 
hardship if payment is discontinued or who used such monies for social 
upliftment, was sanctioned by item 11(1) of the transitional arrangements 
and is in line with the objectives of the Act (as stated in section 2(c), (d) and 
(f)) and with the Act’s intention to redress past discrimination (see Mostert 
Mineral law 134). The court indicated that item 11(1) expressly dealt with the 
situation after the mining right had come to an end (par 23). The court 
reasoned that item 11 excluded contractual royalties (such as in the Xstrata 
decision) on the basis of the type of person and not the type of agreement 
(mineral lease) (par 23). 
    It is submitted that implementing the broader argument advanced by SFF 
of rather working with the exchange agreement rather than the mineral lease 
would have encountered further problems. Rendering of performance in 
terms of the exchange agreement (rather than the mineral lease) by paying 
money (in the form of royalties) after conversion of the old-order mining right 
would have been impossible due to enactment of the Act. In Southern Era 
Resources Ltd v Farndell (2010 (4) SA 200 (SCA) par 8) it was accepted as 
a general proposition, that a party to a contract was discharged from its 
obligation if impossibility of performance supervened on account of a change 
in the law of the land. It was decided in Southern Era that registration of a 
cession of mineral rights was impossible because of the repeal by the Act of 
the registration provisions in the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 (par 4). 
Rendering of further performance (mining and payment of royalties) in terms 
of a broader exchange agreement after conversion of the old-order mining 
right would also have been impossible due to being inconsistent with the 
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provisions of the Act (see further Badenhorst 2012 Obiter 440–441 and 444). 
It should be remembered that in the Xstrata decision, performance in terms 
of the exchange agreement (and mineral lease) had taken place prior to the 
Act except for the continuation of mining and payment of royalties after 
enactment of the Act. 
    The outcome of the decision of the SCA is that double royalties are not 
payable. During the period of transition (contractual) royalties were payable 
to SFF as original grantor of the mining right and holder of the old-order 
mining right. Upon conversion of the old-order mining right (statutory) 
royalties were (according to the court) only payable to the state as custodian 
of mineral resources. In terms of section 3(1) of the Act the mineral 
resources “are the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and the 
State is the custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans”. These 
statements in section 3(1) were more recently held by Wallis JA to 
encapsulate “in non-technical language the notion that the right to mine 
vests in the state” (Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 
(5) SA 1 par 86 (“Agri SA III”)). Since the Xstrata decision by the SCA 
section 3 was interpreted differently by the Constitutional court in Agri South 
Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy [2013] (ZACC) 9 (“Agri SA IV”). 
Chief Justice Mogoeng did not favour the view that prior to the Act the right 
to mine was vested in the state by virtue of a public-law power (see par 35). 
Mogoeng CJ merely accepted that the state was then, the custodian of the 
mineral and petroleum resources on behalf of all the people of South Africa, 
which was their common heritage (par 25). In the minority judgment of 
Justice Froneman it was accepted that the state then had the power to 
decide whether to exploit minerals they owned and to whom they could give 
their exploitation rights by virtue of its custodianship of mineral resources 
under the MPRDA (par 8I). It seemed as if the minority of the Constitutional 
court might adhere to the view that ownership of unsevered minerals vested 
in the state whilst, Chief Justice Mogoeng merely accepted the construction 
of custodianship of such unsevered minerals. 
    According to the interpretation of the SCA in Agri SA III, the right to mine 
must have been reserved by the state for itself. Mostert (Mineral Law 114), 
however, argues that neither ownership of minerals nor the right to prospect 
or mine has been reserved by the state (see also Dale et al South African 
Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-10), but rather, the administrative ability 
to grant such rights to others. Her view is in line with the view that the 
MPRDA has given powers and functions in the public-law sense and not 
private-law rights. Whilst, it is not disputed that the state has the 
administrative ability to grant rights to minerals in terms of the Act, these 
rights as such must have a source (custodianship/ownership of minerals or 
the right to mine) and have to be vested in some holder (whether by virtue of 
private law or public law). A right without a holder (“in the air”) simply would 
not do. In terms of the Agri SA III pronouncement, the state is not only the 
grantor of the new mining right but (prior to such grant) also the holder of the 
right to mine. In short, since conversion of an old-order mining right royalties 
are only payable to the state as the true piper who calls the tune. The 
outcome of the decision of the court a quo that royalties were payable to 
SFF and the state was clearly wrong. What made the said outcome even 
worse was that in so far as SFF is a state organ, double royalties would in 
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effect have been payable to the state.  The SCA did not expressly deal with 
or addressed the erroneous judgment of the court a quo. 
    The converse of a duty is a right. It is submitted that upon conversion of 
the old-order mining right into a (new) mining right (and registration thereof) 
the right of SFF to claim royalties was extinguished or terminated. Tavistock 
argued that upon such loss of royalties, SFF would not have been prejudiced 
because it would be able to recover compensation from the state for its loss 
in terms of item 12 of the transitional arrangements of the Act (see par 25). 
Although Wallis JA initially relied on item 12 as part of his reasoning he 
decided not to attach any weight to item 12 (par 25). Justification for  his  
total disregard of an important provision such as item 12 is sought in his 
view that “it may be debatable whether the Act does in fact expropriate the 
rights that were enjoyed under the old minerals regime” (par 24). 
    The Xstrata decision was of course the precursor to Wallis JA’s 
subsequent radical decision in Agri SA III that all mineral rights that existed 
in South Africa prior to the Act were not expropriated under the Act because 
the right to mine minerals remained, as it always had been, vested in the 
state (Agri SA III par 99 85). Wallis JA found that holders of unused old-
order rights were not deprived of their rights because they not only retained 
a preference to apply for a prospecting right or a mining right for a year, but 
“would acquire more extensive rights if they sought and obtained a 
prospecting right or mining right” (par 97). Wallis JA further found, albeit 
obiter, (see par 90) that holders of old-order prospecting rights or old-order 
mining rights who applied for conversion of their rights were not deprived of 
the right to prospect or mine because of the continuation of their prospecting 
or mining activities and the similar content of present rights and previous 
rights (par 98–90). The court did not exclude the possibility, based on the 
facts of a particular case, that the Act may have expropriated prior existing 
rights (par 99). 
    It is submitted that the Agri SA III decision was incorrect in so far as 
expropriations of mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights did take 
place upon commencement of the Act (see further Badenhorst 
“Expropriation of ‘Unused Old Order Rights’ by the MPRDA: You had 
nothing! Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA (CALS amicus curiae)” 
2013 THRHR 472; “Large-scale Expropriation of Mineral Rights in South 
Africa: The Agri South Africa fiasco” 2012 31 ARELJ 205; Van der Vyver 
“Nationalisation of Mineral Rights in South Africa” 2012 De Jure 125 134–
138). The SCA should at least have decided that in the case of holders of 
unused old-order rights who did not (or could not as in the Agri SA case) 
have applied for new prospecting or mining rights during the one-year 
transitional period, expropriation took place because their allocated right to 
mine (“in the sense of the right (sic) to prospect and mine for minerals” (par 
99) (and not the state’s public power to control mining) was acquired by the 
state. It is conceded that holders of old-order prospecting rights and old-
order mining rights acquired more or less the same entitlements on 
conversion. It is submitted that despite the Agri SA III decision, it is still 
arguable that in the case of unsuccessful applications for or conversions to 
(new) (prospecting rights or) mining rights or failure to apply, expropriation 
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took place because the state acquired the allocated “right to mine” from such 
former holders upon enactment of the Act. It was always argued that the loss 
of the right to claim royalties by a former holder of mineral rights constituted 
an expropriation of property for purposes of a claim against the state in 
terms of item 12 of the transitional arrangements (Badenhorst 2002 Obiter 
250 276–277; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South 
Africa 2004 25-52–25-53). It is further submitted that despite the Agri SA III 
decision, upon successful conversions of old-order mining rights, the loss of 
royalty payments does constitute an expropriation of property by enactment 
of the Act because of the extinguishment of the personal right 
(“vorderingsreg”) of former mineral-right holders to claim royalties in terms of 
prior existing mineral leases (The same applies to the loss of the right to 
claim prospecting fees in terms of former prospecting contracts). Personal 
rights are of course capable of being the object of expropriation (Gildenhuys 
Onteieningsreg (2001) 63). At least, it should be argued that this instance is 
one of the possible expropriations Wallis JA may have had in mind. The 
majority of the Constitutional Court, however, decided In Agri SA IV that the 
state did not acquire, and, therefore, did not expropriate, the ownership of 
mineral resources or the mineral rights of holders of unused old-order rights 
(par 68 and 71). This decision of the Constitutional Court in Agri SA IV was 
rendered after the Xstrata decision by the SCA, and its application may be 
restricted to “unused old-order rights” as Agri SA IV did not deal with a 
conversion of old-order mining rights into new mining rights (which was the 
case in the Xstrata decision of the SCA). The possibility of other 
expropriations by the MPRDA was also left open by Mogoeng CJ in Agri SA 
IV (par 75). 
    In Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy ([2011] 3 All SA 296 (GNP) 
par 82 (“Agri SA II”) the court a quo decided that expropriation of unused 
old-order rights did take place because, the state acquired the substance of 
the property rights of the erstwhile holder of common-law mineral rights. Du 
Plessis J reasoned that from a reading of section 3 and 5 Act, the Minister 
was, upon commencement of the Act, “vested with the power to confer 
rights, the contents of which were substantially the same as, and in some 
respects, identical to, the contents of common-law mineral rights” (par 82). 
The decision of the court a quo is preferred as being correct (see further 
Badenhorst and Olivier “Expropriation of ‘Unused Old Order Rights’ by the 
MPRDA: You have Lost it! Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy” 2012 
THRHR 329). By analogy to the reasoning of Du Plessis J in Agri SA II, the 
state acquired the pan-pipes of the former piper. It is submitted that the 
definitions of royalties provided by the SCA also support the idea that a 
royalty is payable to someone in exchange for the right or privilege to mine 
on land. In reality, that someone either holds the mineral rights, right to mine, 
mining rights or owns the minerals in situ. Prior to the MPRDA (contractual) 
royalties were payable to holders of mineral rights. The state now holds the 
right to mine, or alternatively, owns the mineral resources or holds the 
custody thereof on behalf of the people of South Africa. That is the rationale 
for payment of royalties to the state. It is conceded that royalties can now in 
terms of the MPRDA, unlike contractual royalties before, be construed as a 
form of tax. It is further conceded that the definition of royalties cited by the 
SCA was made within the context of a mineral lease. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The SCA resolved the issue whether payment of royalties by virtue of 
mineral leases executed prior to enactment of the Act should continue to 
take place upon enactment of the Act. During the transitional period holders 
of old-order mining rights remained obliged to pay such (contractual) 
royalties. The source of the duty was the underlying old-order mining right 
that was recognized by the Act during the period of transition. However, 
upon conversion of an old-order mining right to a (new) mining right 
(contractual) royalties are no longer payable to the former holder of 
common-law mineral rights. Such continued payment would be contrary to 
the provisions of the Act. Upon conversion (statutory) royalties are payable 
to the state. The source of such duty is the custodianship of mineral 
resources or, rather, the right to mine which is vested in the state. The 
outcome of the decision avoids the payment of double royalties to the former 
holder of mineral rights and the state, and protects the viability of marginal 
mines and jobs. 
    The decision can be explained as follows: Since enactment of the Act, the 
particular right to mine is retained by the holder of an old-order mining right. 
Upon conversion of the old-order mining right it is, rather, the right to mine, 
as acquired by the state upon termination of the old-order mining right, which 
is granted by the state to an applicant. The duty to pay royalties, or its 
converse the right to claim royalties was extinguished when the old-order 
mining right was terminated upon: (a) conversion and registration of the new 
mining right; (b) failure to apply for such conversion; or (c) refusal by the 
Minister of an application for conversion. The loss of such right should be 
recognized as an expropriation of property for purposes of a claim of 
compensation against the state in terms of item 12 of the transitional 
arrangements of the Act. In the light of the Agri SA IV decision this 
explanation and recognition seem unacceptable and unlikely.  Such a claim 
should, however, be recognized. After all, the state is Grahame’s Piper at 
the Gates of Dawn who also gets paid for playing a recycled old song. As in 
the story, the Piper’s music causes memories (of negotiated royalties) to 
fade away softly. 
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